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REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC:
SECESSION BY QUEBEC IS A NEARLY
IMPOSSIBLE TASK

I. INTRODUCTION

For nearly three hundred years, three distinct cultures have inhabited
Canada: the English, the French, and the Aboriginal peoples.' Quebec is
the only predominantly French-speaking province in Canada.2 Although
the Canadian Government recognizes French as the second official language
of Canada and affords Quebec great latitude in maintaining its cultural
identity, pro-secessionists maintain Quebec should be a distinct society. 3
This is primarily because French-Canadian separatists claim that their right
to a distinct cultural identity and self-governance as a province have been
breached repeatedly .' Another cause is that the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms5 does not address the concerns of French-Canadian citizens.6
This Comment examines whether principals of self-determination and
sovereignty of nations afford Quebec the right to unilaterally secede under
Canadian constitutional law or international law. This Comment concludes,
as did the Canadian Supreme Court, that Quebec does not have the right to
secede unilaterally under Canadian or international law.
Citizens of Quebec opposed to secession espouse a different view.
They maintain that French-Canadian separatists do not take into account that
Quebec reaps more benefits from the federal government than any other
province. 7 Also, they maintain that those in favor of secession do not
consider that Canada has attempted to reach Constitutional accords with the
citizens of Quebec on numerous key issues such as education and

1. See Mary Janigan, The Meat of the Matter, MACLEANS, Feb. 1998, at 16.

2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1995) (Can.).
6. See id.
7. See Janigan, supra note 1, at 16.
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parliamentary representation. The separatists' far reaching demands have
made it difficult for Quebec and the rest of Canada to coexist
harmoniously. 9 Further, separatists ignore other international decisions
concerning the issue of secession. The United States Supreme Court has
held that once an indissoluble union is created it cannot be dissolved for any
reason.'° In addition, the recent dissolution of the Soviet Union indicates
the extremely high threshold a state must meet to effect unilateral secession.
As the Canadian Supreme Court concludes, this is not a threshold that the
Quebec separatists can reach. "
It was against this political and social backdrop that the Parti Quebecois
gained an election victory in September of 1994.12 The Parti Quebecois
campaigned on a promise to lead Quebec to sovereignty. 3 Subsequently,
a referendum vote took place regarding Quebec's secession from Canada in
October of 1995'4 in which the separatists were narrowly defeated. 15 The
separatists efforts continue to be an issue at the forefront of political debate
for all Canadians. The Governor in Council of Canada, acting pursuant to
§53 of the Supreme Court Act, 6 referred questions to the Supreme Court
of Canada concerning the secession issue. 17 The first question was whether
Canadian constitutional law gives the National Assembly, legislature or
government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec
unilaterally. ' 8 The second question is whether international law gives the
National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to
unilaterally secede. 19 The final question is whether there is a right to selfdetermination under international law that would give the National

8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868).
11. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at *4
(Can. Aug. 20, 1998).
12. See Janigan, supra note 1, at 16.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Supreme Court Act, § 53(1)(9)(1985)(Can.)
17. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at *2
(Can. Aug. 20, 1998).
18. See id.
19. See id.
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Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally. 20
This comment analyzes the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada
to lend further support to the appropriate conclusion reached by the Court
based upon analysis of Canadian and international law principles that
Quebec does not have the right to secede unilaterally.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S REFERENCE JURISDICTION

A. The Constitutionalityof Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act
The French-Canadian separatists argued via an amicus curiae 2' brief
that section 101 of the Constitution Act of 186722 does not permit the
Canadian Parliament to grant reference jurisdiction pursuant to section 53
of the Supreme Court Act of 1985.23 The separatists claim that because the
question of whether Quebec can secede concerns only issues of international
law, the court has no jurisdiction.24 Further, the separatists argue that if
reference jurisdiction is valid, the issues addressed by the Court are not
within the Supreme Court Act because they are "political in nature. "25
The court notes that section 53 of the Supreme Court Act establishes
the Canadian Supreme Court as both a court of appeal and as an "additional
court for the better administration of the laws of Canada." 26 It can scarcely
be argued that these issues do not concern "the better administration of the
laws of Canada, 27 because the questions involve the possible dissolution of
the Canadian union. French-Canadian separatists, however, argue that their
secession has nothing to do with the laws of Canada. They claim that

20. See id.
21. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, (Can.
Aug. 20, 1998). An amicus curiae brief is one given by a "friend of the court." In this
Reference, the amicus curiae brief was submitted on behalf of the French-Canadian
separatist movement. Id. at 10.
22. Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1967), § 101.
23. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 53(1)(a), (d), (2) (1985) (Can.).
24. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at *10
(Can. Aug. 20, 1998).
25. See idat *10.
26. See idat * 10-11. Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act is constitutionally valid if (1)
"a general court of appeal can exercise original jurisdiction, and (2) a general court of
appeal can render advisory opinions." See id.
27. See id.at *10.
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section 101 of the Constitution Act states that the "laws of Canada" consist
only of Federal law and statute. 28
The Supreme Court found that the Constitution Act allows it to receive
original jurisdiction under special circumstances.29 The previous Canadian
Supreme Court history clearly shows that the court has granted original
jurisdiction regarding topics such as language, education, and human rights
issues. 30 Thus, one could contend a fortiori, that a grant of original
jurisdiction in this instance is even more appropriate.
The secession of Quebec, if it occurs, could have serious economic and
political consequences for all Canadians. It is therefore paramount that
issues concerning the legalities of a possible secession by Quebec are
analyzed. Section 53 provides that the Governor in Council can refer
important questions concerning fact or law to the court.31 Therefore, a
possible secession by Quebec definitely meets the threshold requirements for
original jurisdiction because the possible dissolution of the Canadian union
is certainly an important question.
Separatists argue that if the Supreme Court Act of 1985 does not
expressly authorize the rendering of advisory opinions, the Court does not
have the power to exercise it. 32 The Court noted that the Canadian
Constitution does not have a strict separation of powers.33 In fact, other
branches of the Canadian government routinely request advisory opinions
of the court. Therefore, there is no constitutional bar to the court rendering
advisory opinions.

B. The Supreme Court's Reference Jurisdiction Under Section 53
The separatists claim that the question of whether international law

gives French-Canadian sparatists the riaht to unilateraly e ede is b

-y.n

the scope of section 53 jurisdiction granted to the Court, 35 An examination
of section 53 of the Supreme Court Act reveals that the separatists' concerns
lack merit. The answer as to whether Canadian constitutional law affords
Quebec the right to unilaterally secede comes from section 53(l)(a) of the

28.
29.
30.
31.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

*10.
*11.
*12-13.
*12-13.

32. See id. at *11.
33. See id. at *12.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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Supreme Court Act, which confers jurisdiction upon the court for the
interpretation of Constitution Acts.36 The court receives jurisdiction for
both of the issues mentioned above from section 53(1)(d).37 This section
gives jurisdiction to the court for issues relating to the powers of the
government of a particular province.38 These interpretations of the Supreme
Court Act comport with the plain meaning approach of statutory
interpretation that the Canadian Supreme Court utilizes in exceptional
cases. 39 Both questions also fall under section 53(2) because they are
"important questions of law or fact concerning any matter. "40
Separatists also argue that the Court would exceed its jurisdiction by
acting as an international tribunal and performing beyond its competence
because the Court must interpret international law. 4' The first contention,
that the Court is acting as an international tribunal, does not merit much
discussion because the Court is only rendering an advisory opinion.42 The
Court, in addressing issues of international law concerning a possible
unilateral secession by Quebec, will not bind any other state or tribunal that
may consider a similar question in the future.4 3 The separatist's second

contention is equally without merit because the Court has addressed issues
of international law in other cases." The question of whether international
law affords Quebec the opportunity to secede under international law is not
solely an issue of international law. Rather, this question seeks to determine
the legal rights of Quebec's secession under international law as it relates to
the Canadian Federation.45

36. Supreme Court Act, ch. S-26, § 53(1)(a) (1985) (Can.).
37. Supreme Court Act, ch. S-26, § 53(1)(d) (1985) (Can.).

38. See id.
39. Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin [1996] 139 D.L.R. 4t' 426 (Can.).

40. Supreme Court Act, ch. S-26, § 53(2) (1985) (Can.).
41. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at *13
(Can. Aug. 20, 1998).

42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Reference re Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia
[1987] S.C.R. 792, 814 (Can.).
45. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at *14
(Can. Aug. 20, 1998).
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C. Justiciability
The primary goal of the Court is to "retain its proper role within the
Constitutional framework of our democratic form of government., 46 The
Court agreed with this view and stated that it must determine whether the
question is "purely political in nature,"4 7 and whether the question has4a8
"sufficient legal component to warrant intervention of the judicial branch. ,
The issues here are limited to the legal framework that underlies any
decision by Quebec to secede. 49 They do not, as amicus curiae for the
separatists claims, usurp a democratic decision of the people of Quebec. 50
There are two instances where the court has exercised its discretion not
to provide an answer to a reference question. The first occurs when the
question posed is too imprecise. 5' A second instance is when the parties
52
have not provided the information necessary to give a complete answer.
The issues here do not satisfy either of these criteria. First, the issues could
not be more clear. The Court is merely required to advise whether Quebec
has the right to secession under international law or Canadian law. Second,
the court has all the information it needs at its disposal. In this case, the
necessary information would be documentation concerning Canadian and
international law, which is readily available to the court. Further, the court
stated that even if the issues are ambiguous on their face, they are not
required to provide a "simple yes or no answer. "3 In cases of ambiguity,
the court can qualify both the question and the answer rather than merely
rejecting it.5 4 Under this analysis, the grant of reference jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court of Canada is constitutionally valid.

46.
47.
(Can.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, 545 (B.C.).
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at *14
Aug. 20, 1998).
See id. at 14.
See id. at 15.
See id.
McEvoy v. Attorney General for New Brunswick [1983] 1 S.C.R. 704, 708 (Can.).
Reference re Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House [1980] 1 S.C.R.

54 at para. 257 (Can.).
53. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at *15-16
(Can. Aug. 20, 1998).

54. See Id. at 16.
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THE ISSUE OF QUEBEC'S RIGHT To SECEDE UNILATERALLY
UNDER CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Background
A constitution is more than a written text.55 This statement embodies
the major principle behind the opinion that the Canadian Constitution does
not need to have specific provisions to prevent the secession of Quebec from
Canada unilaterally. The principles of the Canadian Constitution firmly
embrace the notion that Quebec does not have the right to secede
unilaterally. The court states that the Constitution "embraces unwritten, as
well as written rules." 56 The court gave a brief historical overview of the
formulation of the Canadian Federation.57 Next, the Court cited the major58
constitutional principles that are relevant to analyze this reference question.
These principles are federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule
of law, and protection of minorities 59 .
When interpreting the Constitution, one should note that these key
principles must work together to become effective. 60 The Court has stated
that the observance of these principles is essential to the continuation of
constitutional development. 6' The history of Supreme Court decisions
shows that "Canadians have long recognized the existence and importance
of unwritten constitutional principles in our system of government." 62
A principal argument by secessionists is that there is no constitutional
provision or judicial decision that could prevent the secession of Quebec. 63
However, the Canadian Supreme Court insists upon the primacy of its
written constitution. 64 As the court correctly stated, a written constitution

55. See id. This means the Canadian constitution may beyond the mere scope of its
wording in order to effect decisions for the benefit of Canada and all Canadians.
56. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at *15-16
(Can. Aug. 20, 1998).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319, 386
(Can.).
62. Id. at 387.
63. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25508,1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at *29 (Can.
Aug. 20, 1998).
64. See id.
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promotes "legal certainty and predictability," 65 and it provides a foundation
and a touchstone for the exercise of judicial review. 66 It is only through
legal structure and the Supreme Court's power of judicial review that any
decision regarding Quebec's future would hold any credence with the
international community or the citizens of Canada.
B. Federalism
It is undisputed that Canada is a federal state much like the United
States and Australia. 67 However, French-Canadian separatists claim that
according to the 1867 Constitution Act, Canada's federal system is only a
partial one. 68 If it were indeed correct that Canada's federal system of
government is only partial, it would provide Quebec with the impetus
necessary to perform a unilateral secession. However, one cannot look
solely to the Constitution to determine the plausibility of this argument.
How the government operates is just as important. 69 "A country may have
a Federal Constitution, but in practice it may work that constitution in such
a way that its government is not federal." 7 ° The same notion can be
conveyed in the opposite manner. Canada's situation is illustrative of this
axiom.71 Canada's constitution is quasi-federal.7 2 However, in practice the
Constitution is predominantly federal. 73 The federal government must
control the limits of the provinces. 74 Without this control, the provinces of
Canada could defy the Constitution at will.
Federalism allows the provincial governments to govern their respective
territories with autonomy. The Supreme Court noted that the goal of
federalism should be to promote diversity. 75 French-Canadian separatists
claim they lack diversity. 76 As the only predominantly French-speaking

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
(Can.
76.

Id.
See id.
See K.C. WI-HEARE,
See id. at 17-18.
See id. at 18-19.
Id. at 20.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

18-20 (1963).

See id.
See WHEARE, supra note 70, at 20.
See id.
Haig v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 995, 1047 (1993).
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can.Sup.Ct. LEXIS 39, at 23
Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998).
See id.
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province in Canada, Quebec's very existence proves that Canadian
federalism protects Canadian diversity. Further, the court has stated that the
diversity of provinces "[is] a rational part of political reality in the Federal
process."" This is illustrative of the goal of federalist principles because
federalism looks to the pursuit of collective goals.78 It was through the
federalist structure that French-speaking persons in Quebec were able to
promote their linguistic and cultural concerns. 79
C. Democracy
French-Canadian separatists claim that the democratic principle would
allow them to exercise their right to sovereignty if a clear majority of
persons in Quebec were in favor of unilateral secession through the referral
vote process.80 Initially, the Court noted that the democratic principle is "a
baseline against what the framers of our constitution, and subsequently, our
elected representatives under it, have always operated." 8 ' They also note
that it is a "system of majority rule. ,82 However, the Court made it clear
by stating that "democracy is not simply concerned with the process of
government. ,8 3 The Supreme Court of Canada has noted in prior cases that
the democratic principle is most intimately connected with the promotion of
self-government, meaning that "a sovereign people should exercise their
right to self-government through the democratic process. "84 Further, the
Court previously interpreted democracy to mean the right of the people to
vote and be represented by a responsible government.8 5 In this regard it
would not be responsible for Quebec to attempt unilateral secession on the
basis of a single referendum vote.
The court did concede that democracy would express a peoples'
sovereign will. 86 However, democracy embraces other concepts such as
federalism and the rule of law.Y More specifically, the legal framework

77. Id.

78. See id.
79. See id.

80. See id.
81. Id. at 24.
82. See id.
83. See id.

84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 25.
87. See id.
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determines a people's sovereignty and how it should be implemented.88 The
Canadian political system would possess no inherent legitimacy if it is based
solely on the democratic principle without any legal check.8 9 The court
said, "it would be a grave mistake to equate legitimacy with the 'sovereign
will' or majority rule alone, to the exclusion of other constitutional
values.

"'

Even if the referendum vote proved that a majority of the citizens of
Quebec wanted to secede, the popular vote would have no constitutional
significance on its own. 91 There is no historical or political basis to presume
that the referendum vote would settle the policy of the federal government
on the Quebec secession issue. 92 The federal government must give
consideration to the other constitutional principles mentioned above as
well. 93 In this instance, the federal government would have to consider
issues such as the effect Quebec secession would have on the other
provinces, the consequences for aboriginal peoples in Quebec, and whether
Quebec's complaints could be remedied by a means other than secession. 9'
Although there is no basis for unilateral secession, if the referendum shows
a majority of the citizens of Quebec in favor of secession, the
aforementioned constitutional principles may obligate the federal
government to negotiate with Quebec in order to effect secession. 95 In this
scenario, all Canadian provinces would have to agree to the plan. 96 This is
so because no provisions can be made under the Canadian Constitution that
would not benefit Canada as a whole. 97
D. Constitutionalismand the Rule of Law
The concepts of constitutionalism and the rule of law refute the
sepri.

t it'

claim that no legal mandates..requied

f.or;

.uc.cc
to secede

from Canada. The Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial

88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 136-137 (1997).

92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Can.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) at *30.
96. Constitution Act, sec. 25, 35, 52(1),(2),(1982) (Can.).
97. See id.
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Court of Prince Edward Island says "the exercise of all public power must
find its ultimate source in a legal rule. ,98 The court further explained that
the rule of law provides that the law is supreme over acts of private persons
or groups of people. 99 To support this notion, the Manitoba Language
Rights Reference states that "the rule of law requires the creation and
maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which preserves and
embodies the more general principle of normative order." 100 In other
words, if the rule of law is not supreme, the Canadian Constitution means
nothing and what results is a disorderly society with no consistent legal
principles upon which the people of Canada could rely.' 0 '
The court encapsulates these principles by stating, "the
Constitutionalism principle requires that all government action must comply
with the Constitution " 1 2 and that "the Rule of Law principle requires that
all government action must comply with the law, including the
Constitution. , 03 In OperationDismantle v. The Queen," the court noted
that the constitution binds all governments, federal and provincial. 10 5 These
concepts are not trivial, as separatists would like us to believe, and they
cannot be superseded by a simple majority vote. These principles provide
additional safeguards for the protection of human rights.o6 Further, they
ensure that minority groups receive the rights necessary to "maintain and
principles also
promote their identities.""°7 Finally, these constitutional
8
10
power.
governmental
of
allocation
facilitate the

In Texas v. White, the proposed secession of Texas from the United
States in 1868 demonstrated a more concrete application of constitutionalism

98. Reference re Renenumeration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward
Island [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 10.

99. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39
(Can. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) at *26.
100. Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985] 1 S.C.R. 726 at 749.
101. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Can.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) at *26.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 457.
105. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Can.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) at *26.
106. Id. at 27.
107. Id.

108. See id.
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and the rule of law by the United States Supreme Court. 1°9 The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected an attempt by Texas to secede by postulating that
when Texas joined the union an indissoluble relationship was created. "0 It
should be noted that Texas had recently become a member of the new
United States union. In comparison, Quebec has also joined an indissoluble
union."' But more importantly, Quebec has been a part of this union for
over 200 years. The Canadian federation is now more sophisticated with
regards to public policy and infrastructure.11 2 Additionally, Canada covers
a much larger territory. 113 Dissolving the union now would create
tremendous hardships for numerous segments of Canadian Society. If the
United States Supreme Court could not find legitimacy in a Texas secession
effort in 1868, it is doubtful that French-Canadian separatists could justify
their cause without the rule of law." 4
The separatists' last claim is that constitutionalism is not compatible
with democratic government. n5 This is another way of claiming that
adherence to Canadian law is not needed to effect secession from Canada.
The Court rejected this notion by noting that Constitutionalism and the Rule
of Law are essential to the democratic principle. 1 6 This is because "the
political will upon which the court states democratic decisions are taken
would itself be undermined."" 7

109. Texas V. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726. Chief Justice Chase stated, [When , therefore,
Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All of the
obligations of perpetual union, and all of the guaranties of the republican government in the
union, attached at once to the State. The act which consumated her admission to the Union
was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into a
political body. And it was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union
between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except
through revolution, or through consent of the States.]
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. H. Wade MacLauchlan, Accounting for Democracy and The Rule of Law in the
Quebec Secession Reference. 76 CAN. BAR REv. 155 (1997) at 169.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Can.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) at 27.
116. Id. at 28.
117. Id.
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E. Protection of Minorities
French-Canadian separatists have long argued that the principle of
protection of minorities could not stop the secession of Quebec unilaterally
if the majority of Quebec's citizens are in favor of secession. 118 However,
it is clear that the protection of minority peoples' religious, educational, and
human rights were a primary consideration in talks leading to the formation
of the Confederation of Canadian States.1 9 The newly formed federal
government did not want minority peoples to lack proper representation in
the new Canadian Confederation. 120 The court notes that "the concern for
minorities has been prominent in recent years."1 21 In fact, the Constitution
Act of 1982 explicitly protected the rights of minority peoples. 122
Contrary to the presumption of French-Canadian separatists, minority
and aboriginal peoples would be affected by secession. They would find
themselves in a foreign country and any link to Canada would be severed
irrevocably. 21 3 Aboriginal peoples must be included in any negotiations
regarding secession by Quebec and the federal government must procure
their consent. 124 Although the consent given would be indirect, via the
federal government, this does not dilute its enforceability. " This is because
Canada has a fiduciary obligation to minority and aboriginal peoples and
this obligation requires Canada to get their consent. 126 Without such
consent, members of parliament are required to oppose any Constitutional
amendment concerning secession. 127 It is also possible that the Court could
provide injunctive relief to minority and aboriginal peoples because
secession of Quebec without their consent would be a constitutional
violation. 128 Thus, the protection-of-minorities principle would not allow

118. See id.
119. Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act. (Ont.) [1987] S.C.R.
1148 at 1173.
120. See id.
121. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Can.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) at 28.
122. See Constitution Act., Sec. 35, (1982) (Can.).
123. See Patrick J. Monahan, The Law and Politicsof Quebec Secession, 33 OSG. HALL
1, 17.

124. See id.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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Quebec to secede unilaterally without the minority peoples consent, and this
principle would play a key role in any negotiations between Quebec and the
federal government moving towards secession.
F. The Effectivity Principle
Another argument that has been placed at the forefront of the separatist
claims revolves around the principle of effectivity. 129 The effectivity
principle postulates that the people of Quebec inherently hold the right to
secede unilaterally. It is up to the citizenry of Quebec whether or not they
choose to exercise it. 130 However, the court drew a distinction between the
right to act and the power to do so.13 ' The court stated, "[a] right is

recognized in law; mere physical ability is not necessarily given status as a
right. ,132
Without any legal entitlement to secession, Quebec's success would
depend upon the level of international recognition they receive. These are
of the prospects for
concerns which will be discussed through an analysis
133
a unilateral secession under international law.
The principle of effectivity does not provide any constitutional or legal
basis for secession. 134 The court showed the absurdity of this principle by
stating that "acceptance of a principle of effectivity would be tantamount to
accepting that Quebec may act without regard to the law, simply because it
asserts the power to do so.,, 1 35 The effectivity principle is an assertion of

fact that has no place in the analysis of arguments concerning the legality of
a unilateral secession by Quebec. 136

129. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at
*35 (Can. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998).

130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.

133. Suzanne Lalonde, Quebec and the Principleof Effectiveness, 76 CAN. BAR REV.
258, 259.
134. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at
*36 (Can. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998).
135. See id.
136. See id.
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IV. WHETHER INTERNATIONAL LAW GIVES QUEBEC
THE RIGHT To SECEDE UNILATERALLY

A. Overview
The Supreme Court of Canada began its review of the application of
international law to the secession of Quebec noting the Court was not
attempting to produce binding authority that will affect the secession efforts
of other states within the international community. 13' The Court was,
however, rendering an advisory opinion that could potentially hold the
38
future existence of the Canadian Federation of States in the balance.
Since international law is an issue that the court must address using
reference jurisdiction, it follows from the jurisdictional power of the Court
39
from Section II of this comment that the Court must analyze this issue. ,
The principal argument of the separatists is that regardless of the
existence of a right to unilateral secession, international law will eventually
recognize the formation of a new political state.'40 A positive legal right to
international recognition however, is drastically different from making a
political prediction of how the international community will respond to a
new state created against the wishes of the parent state.14 1 The Supreme
Court's focus was the legalities of unilateral secession under international
law. 42 Although there are few cases that focus on secession specifically,
there are various doctrines and concepts that show that unilateral secession
under international law involves more that just the right of the people to do

137. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at
*36 (Can. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998). "In addressing this issue the court does not purport to
act as an arbiter between sovereign states or more generally within the international
community. The court is engaged in rendering an advisory opinion on certain legal aspects
of the continued existence of the Canadian Federation. international law has been invoked
as a consideration and it must therefore be discussed." Id.
138. See id.

139. See id.
140. Luzius Wildtaber, TerritorialModifications andBreakups in FederalStates, (1995)
33 Canadian YBIL 41-74, at 41-42. "There are indications that self-determination may now
go beyond decolonization, triggering claims to get rid of foreign occupations that flagrantly
violate human rights and constitute an extreme repression both of the will of the majority
and popular sovereignty. It remains questionable whether current international law goes
over farther. Basically, international law does not yet grant minorities a right to secede and
form a new state at their own will." id.
141. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at
36 (Can. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998).
142. See id.
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sO.1 43 Unilateral secession must be a judicial determination that has its basis
in the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty of nations. 144
B. Secession Under InternationalLaw
1. The Right of Self-Determination
It is a universally accepted principle that international law does not
specifically grant the right of unilateral secession to the component parts of
the parent state. "' Since international law does not specifically grant
unilateral secession, separatists base their argument on two broadly-based
principles. 146 First, since the right to unilateral secession is not "specifically
prohibited" it is "inferentially permitted."' 4 7 Second, other states have a
implied duty to recognize "the legitimacy of secession" that is manifested
through the principle of self-determination of peoples. 148 The Court and the
amicus curiae for those opposed to the secession effort agreed that the
principle of self-determination did not apply to the Quebec situation. 4 9
Although international law does not denote either an acceptance or a
rejection of a state's right to unilateral secession, many commentators have
noted that a denial of the right of unilateral secession may be implicit in
international law because of the high threshold that a state must reach to
properly exercise the right. 50 International law places heavy emphasis on
the territorial integrity of states. 151 The creation of a new state is generally
determined via the law of the existing parent state. 5 2 In Quebec's situation
the mandate is clear. A unilateral secession by Quebec would be
incompatible with Canadian domestic law. 153 Therefore, an international
law determination as to whether Quebec has a right to unilateral secession

143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Jeremy Webber, The Legality of a UnilateralSecession of a UnilateralDeclaration
of Independence under CanadianLaw, 42 McGILL L.J. 281, 291.
146. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at
*37 (Can. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998).
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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will turn on the right of peoples to self-determination.154 Moreover, the
Declaration on Friendly Relations 55 demonstrates the high regard that the
international community places on the territorial integrity of states. In an
effort to turn away from the issues of territorial integrity, French-Canadian
separatists claim that any secession effort would be judged by the principle
of effectiveness in international law. 156 In this regard, Quebec must sustain
"the maintenance of a stable and effective government over a reasonably
well defined territory, to the exclusion of the metropolitan state, in such
circumstances that independence is in fact undisputed or manifestly
undisputed." 1 57 Under the effectivity principle, Quebec's right to its
existing territorial boundaries would be severely impaired. 58
The principle of self-determination is widely recognized 59 and is
generally considered a fundamental principle of international law.i6o The
United Nations Charter16' embraces the principle of self-determination. 62
Self-determination is also recognized in other international legal documents.
The Final Act of the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe
states, "the participating states will respect the equal rights of peoples and
their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the
154. See id.
155. See generally U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, 1833rdplen. mtg
at 61-78, U.N. A/8018 (1970). "Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be confirmed
as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting
themselves in compliance with the principles of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour." Suzanne
Lalonde, Quebec and the Principleof Effectiveness, 76 CAN. BAR REv. 258.
156. Lalonde, supra note 164, at 259.
157. See id.
158. P.J. Monynihan, Cooler Heads Should Prevail: Assessing the Costs and
Consequences of Quebec Separation, 65 C.D. HOWE HIST. COMM. 1, 14.
159.

ANTONIO CASESSE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL,

171-72 (1995).
160. KARL DOERRING, SELF-DETERMINATION, 65-67 (Bruno Simma et. al eds., 1994).
161. U.N. CHARTER art.1, para. 2. The Charter states one of its primary goals is "[T]o
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen
universal peace." Id.
162. U.N. CHARTER art. 55. The charter again refers to the self-determination principle
when it states, "[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." Id.

340

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 19

relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial
integrity of states." 163 The principle of self-determination does not afford
French-Canadian separatists the right to unilaterally secede from Canada
because the impetus for their secession effort does not reach the required
threshold of severely egregious constitutional or human rights violations.
2.

The Concept of "Peoples"

International law affords the privilege of self-determination to
"peoples."'164 The concept of "peoples," however, has remained unclear
even as the concept of self-determination has been refined over the years in
international law." 6 The notion of "peoples" can be used in several
different contexts."~ "Peoples," as noted by Anna Michalarska167 "can be
related to a community which is organized in its own state; to 'people' of
a colonial state; [or] to a community which does not have its own state and
is not part of another state.,168 It would be simple to identify 'people' with
the concept of nations.169 It is, however, very difficult to constrain the
meaning to one particular axiom because of the numerous research
perspectives that have been taken. 170
The Court noted this ambiguity by conceding that "peoples" may also
be applicable to a portion of the population of an existing state.171 The
Court also conceded that the right to self-determination is a human right. 172

163. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 14 I.L.M.

1292, (1975).
164. WILLIAM TWINING, ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 72-73 (Neil MacCormick and

Fennon Bankowski et. al. eds., 1991).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. ANNA MICHALARSKA, RIGHTS OF PEOPLES To SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONALLAW, 72-78 (Neil MacCormick and Fennon Bankowski et. al. Eds., 1991).
"The question of defining peoples is still not resolved. Should it include ethnic minorities,

linguistic minorities, or religious minorities, etc., it has to be accepted that the notion of
people denotes different meanings. It is also worth mentioning that the notion 'people'
conveys different meanings in legal terms in national and international law. And it cannot

always be explicitly taken from a legal context." Id.
168. Id.
169. See id.

170. See id.
171. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Can.

Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) at *39.
172. See id.
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This human right is seen in documents "that refer simultaneously to 'nation'
and 'state. ," 173 The Court conceded that the people of Quebec are within
the definition of "peoples" under international law. But as the next section
makes clear, regardless of the definition of "peoples" used, the concept of
separatists as the
self-determination cannot be used by French-Canadian
174
effort.
secession
unilateral
a
for
foundation
3. Quebec's Right to Self-Determination
To determine whether French-Canadian separatists have a right to
unilateral secession via self-determination, the Court begins its analysis by
noting that self-determination is achieved through "a people's pursuit of its
political, economical, social and cultural development within the framework
of an existing state. "175 French-Canadian separatists claim they have this
right because the Canadian government has repeatedly hampered their
development in the above-mentioned areas. 176 However, the Court and most
authorities 177 on this subject agree that the right to unilateral secession under
international law can only be utilized under "extreme cases, and even then,
under carefully defined circumstances. "178 These extreme cases are
generally where there have been egregious human rights abuses and79where
the secession effort is moving towards the decolonization process. 1
Some commentators, however, have suggested that the recent
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Yugoslavia indicate that
International law may be moving toward the recognition of a secession right
rooted in self-determination under any circumstances.1° This shows the
willingness of the international community to recognize the independence
of the Baltic Republics, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.' 8 '
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Janigan, supra note 1,at 16.
177. Patrick J.Moynihan, The Law and Politics of Quebec Secession, 33 OSG. HALL
L.J. 1, 21 (1995).
178. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39 (Can.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 1998) at *40.
179. Karl Doehring, Self-Determination 65-67 (Bruno Simma et. al eds., 1994).
180. L. Eastwood Jr., Secession: State Practice and International Law After the
Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J. CoMP. OF INTERNATIONAL L.
299, 342 (1993).
181. Patrick J. Moynihan, The Law and Politics of Quebec Secession, 33 OsG. HALL.
L.J. 1, 22 (1995).
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These examples, however, do not denote a shift to a new principle
regarding unilateral secession rights. 81 2 The Baltic states' sovereignty was
not recognized until President Boris Yeltsin of Russia officially recognized
The international
Latvian and Estonian independence in 1991.183
community did not recognize the new Baltic States as independent
sovereigns until they were endorsed by Russia."1s Importantly, the Baltic
states were sovereign before they were illegally annexed by the Soviet union
in 194 1.185 Therefore, "even if the response of the international community
suggests some acceptance of secession, such support may mark only the
beginning of international recognition of a limited secession right applicable
to illegally annexed territories rather that a general right of secession.""8 6
The newly independent states of the former Yugoslavia did not result
from secession. 18 7 Rather, they resulted from the dissolution of an existing
state. l88 The European Community's arbitration committee agreed with this
sentiment. 189 And as Patrick Monahan notes the dissolution of a state means
that it no longer has legal personality.190 International bodies such as the
European Commission could recognize the new states because there was no
difficulty regarding the states' territorial integrity. 19 Thus, Slovenia and
Croatia were quickly recognized as independent states. 192
In contrast, Quebec was not illegally annexed by Canada.' 93 Unlike the
situation in the former republic of Yugoslavia, Canada would continue to
exist if there were a secession by Quebec.94 Therefore, the Soviet and

182. See id.
183. L. Eastwood Jr., Secession: State Practice and International Law After the
Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 Duke J. COMP. OF INTERNATIONAL L.
299, 316-321 (1993). The aforementioned pages give the historical overview of the break
up of the former Soviet Union.
184. See id.

185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See Patrick J. Monahan, The Law and Politics of Quebec Secession, 33 Osg. Hall.
L.J. 1, 22 (1995).

188. See Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Committee: Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M.
1494, 1496-1497 (1991).
189. See id.
190. Patrick J. Monahan, The Law and Politics of Quebec Secession, 33 OSG. HALL. L.J.
1, 23 (1995).
191. See id.
192. See id.

193. See id.
194. See id.
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Yugoslavian examples do not denote a shift towards the recognition of a
right to unilateral secession. 9
The Court noted that "the general state of international law with respect
to the right to self-determination is that the right operates within the
overriding protection granted to the territorial integrity of parent states. 96
There are, however limited circumstances under which self-determination
can be exercised to effect secession.'97 The right to self-determination under
these circumstances would be exercised externally, which means restoring
independence. 198 Those circumstances are for those under colonial rule or
those peoples suffering from "domination or exploitation outside a colonial
context. "'99 Despite the views of French-Canadian separatists on this issue,
the Quebec situation simply does not meet this threshold. The statements
of the amicus curiae for those opposed to a Quebec secession effort, which
are endorsed by the Court regarding this issue, encapsulates the Court's
reasoning: "The Quebec people is not the victim of attacks on its physical
existence or integrity, or of a massive violation of its fundamental rights.
The Quebec people is manifestly not an oppressive people. "
French-Canadians have held prestigious positions within the Canadian
government. 201 The current Prime Minister of Canada is a citizen of
Quebec. 2°2 The citizens of Quebec have been able to make choices
concerning the future of the province of Quebec without intervention from
French-Canadian separatists, however,
the Federal Government. 2 3
maintain that the inability of the federal government to agree to
constitutional accords with Quebec amounts to a denial of their selfdetermination. 2' The Court rejects this notion by correctly concluding that
the constitutional provisions in effect do not "place Quebecers in a
disadvantaged position within the scope of the international law rule." 205

195. See id.
196. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at
*10 (Can. Aug. 20, 1998).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id.
See id. at 42.
See id.
See id.

203. See id.

204. See id.
205. See id.
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4. The 'Effectivity' Principle
The amicus curiae for the separatists also advances the argument that
international law does not prohibit secession, and that separatists would gain
international recognition from a secession effort as long as they gained
effective control of the territory that comprises Quebec.206 Separatists fail
to note, however, that the process of international recognition is guided by
legal norms. 2°7 This thinking is further advanced by James Crawford, who
says secession is "neither legal nor illegal in international law, but a legally
neutral act the consequences of which are, or may be, regulated
internationally. ,208
The principle of effectivity proclaims that an illegal secession attempt
could attain a legal status if, it is recognized internationally. 2°9 But, as the
court correctly notes, the principle of effectivity does not provide for
subsequent approval of an initially illegal act which retroactively creates a
legal right to engage in the act in the first place.21°
V. CONCLUSION

The principles of effectivity, self-determination, and sovereignty of
nations do not afford Quebec the right to secede unilaterally under Canadian
or international law. Quebec does not reach the threshold for consideration
of a secession effort. The people of Quebec are not emerging from colonial
rule nor have they been subject to egregious human rights violations.
Therefore, the only hope for French-Canadian separatists is to have a clear
majority of Quebec's citizens vote for secession in a popular referendum
vote. Even then Quebec would be required to negotiate with the federal

206. See id. at 43.
207. H.W.R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, CAMB. L.J. 172, 196 (1955).
208. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (1979).
209. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 39, at
*10 (Can. Aug. 20, 1998).
210. See id. The court further elaborates "it may be that a unilateral secession by Quebec
would eventually be accorded legal status by Canada and other states, and thus give rise to
legal consequences; but this does not support the more radical contention that subsequent

recognition of a declaration of independence could be taken to mean that secession was
achieved under colour of a legal right."
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government and the other Canadian provinces. Given all of the hurdles that
French-Canadian separatists face to effect secession, it is highly unlikely
that Quebec will gain independence from Canada at any point in the near
future.
Charles Whites

